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WAR OF THE WORDS: HOW COURTS  
CAN USE DICTIONARIES IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH TEXTUALIST PRINCIPLES 
PHILLIP A. RUBIN† 
Few people ask by what authority the writers of dictionaries and 
grammars say what they say. 
  – S.I. Hayakawa1 
ABSTRACT 
  Dictionaries have an aura of authority about them—words mean 
what the dictionary says they mean. It therefore seems only sensible 
that courts seeking the plain meaning of language would look to 
dictionaries to find it. Yet to employ dictionaries as objective sources 
of meaning is to use them in a manner inconsistent with their creation 
and purpose. Previous scholarship has identified the Supreme Court’s 
increasing reliance on dictionaries in construing statutes and 
constitutional provisions, and several articles have discussed different 
inherent problems with this practice. This Note builds upon that 
scholarship by bringing together the problems identified in prior 
articles, by identifying additional problems, and by proposing a set of 
best practices for courts seeking to use dictionaries in a manner 
consistent with textualist principles. Unless a principled approach is 
adopted, judges invoking dictionaries in textualist analysis are open to 
criticism for, at best, using dictionaries incorrectly—and, at worst, 
using them to reach their preferred outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judge Harold Leventhal once said, and Justice Scalia has 
repeated, that the use of legislative history is “the equivalent of 
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the 
guests for one’s friends,” allowing judges to pick the evidence that 
best supports their own policy preferences.2 Legislative history, 
however, is not the only external source of interpretation which can 
be used in this way. Dictionaries, too, lend themselves to this sort of 
manipulation, and in recent years, the Court has referred increasingly 
to dictionaries to determine the ordinary meanings of words.3 
Dictionary usage is particularly important in textualist analysis,4 
which seeks to find “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a 
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law”5and places 
foremost priority on the text itself, as opposed to utilizing external 
sources of understanding.6 This method has its proclaimed roots in 
democratic principles: if the nebulous intent of the legislature controls 
over the plain meaning of its published text, how could citizens be on 
notice about the law which they are to follow?7 
Textualism has seen increased purchase on the Supreme Court in 
recent years,8 and with it, the Court has relied increasingly on 
dictionaries in its opinions.9 Prior to 1864, the Court used dictionaries 
as authority only three times.10 Yet during the 1990 through 1998 
 
 2. E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (crediting 
Judge Leventhal for the metaphor). 
 3. See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1437, 1438–42 (1994) (detailing the increased reliance by the Supreme Court on dictionaries, 
focusing in particular on the 1988–1992 Terms); see also Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: 
Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 app. (1998) (detailing 
dictionary usage from the 1988 Term through the 1995 Term). 
 4. Aprill, supra note 3, at 280 (“Dictionary definition plays a key role for textualism.”). 
 5. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 17 (1997). 
 6. See id. (discussing the purposes of and principles behind statutory interpretation). 
 7. See id. (stating that interpreting statutes based on legislative intent is “simply 
incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government”). 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the Court’s 
increased tendency to cite to dictionaries, see Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The 
Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 
BUFF. L. REV. 227, 244–62 (1999). It is covered here briefly only to frame the problem at hand 
and to update the data. 
 10. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 244–62. 
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Terms, the Court used dictionaries to define more than 220 terms.11 
This trend has continued into the 2000s, with the Court citing 
dictionaries (legal, specialty, or general purpose) in twenty-three 
cases during the 2008–2009 Term alone.12 This is consistent with 
earlier findings, for example, that the Court utilized dictionary 
definitions in 28 percent of the 107 cases for which opinions were 
published in the 1991 Term.13 
The manner in which the Court uses dictionaries has changed 
over time as well. Although in the past the Court would “employ[] 
dictionaries to refresh the Justices’ memory about the meaning of 
words, or to provide potential meanings from which the Court would 
select based on statutory purpose, legislative intent, common sense, 
or some other contextual argument,” more recent cases have placed 
dictionaries—rather than policy, context, or structure—at the center 
of the case.14 Though previous scholars have suggested that 
dictionaries are less accepted in questions of constitutional 
interpretation,15 several significant new cases suggest that dictionaries 
now play a crucial role in the interpretation of the Constitution as 
well.16 With core constitutional questions, such as the meaning of the 
Second Amendment,17 being decided on the basis of dictionary 
definitions, it can no longer be said that the “use of the dictionary to 
define constitutional terms . . . is an exception to the rule.”18 
Despite the Court’s increasing focus on dictionaries, scholars 
have identified several distinct and important problems regarding the 
use of these tools in legal reasoning. These problems include arbitrary 
 
 11. Id. at 256. 
 12. A Westlaw search in the SCT database for “dictionary & da(aft 8/2008 & bef 7/2009)” 
yielded twenty-three results. 
 13. Note, supra note 3, at 1438. 
 14. Id. at 1439–40 (footnote omitted). For an example of a recent case in which the Court 
placed dictionary definition at the heart of the analysis, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 
S. Ct. 2783 (2008). This case is discussed in Part IV.B, infra. 
 15. See, e.g., Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 277 (noting that “the Court has relied 
on dictionaries in comparatively few cases interpreting the Constitution” and attributing that 
trend to an opinion by Justice Holmes describing the flexible nature of the Constitution). 
 16. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (using legal and 
general dictionaries to define “affidavit” as it has been applied to the Confrontation Clause); 
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791–92 (relying extensively on dictionaries to define the individual terms of 
the Second Amendment); Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2683 (2008) (using a dictionary to 
define “procure” and “procurement” as “to contrive and effect” in the context of making a 
witness unavailable). 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
 18. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 278. 
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and arguably even biased selection of dictionaries by judges,19 lack of 
determination as to the qualifications of a particular dictionary,20 and 
failure to account for context when using a dictionary to define a 
single term.21 Dictionaries, despite their allure as seemingly perfect 
arbiters of word meaning, do not reach the end goal of word 
definition. Ultimately, a court citing a dictionary is not seeking to find 
out what the dictionary says but rather what the word itself means—
with the dictionary merely serving as a window into the lexicon. This 
means that any legal analysis must account for the inherent 
limitations of dictionaries as proxies for the lexicon.22 This Note seeks 
to bring together the varying analyses, cautions, and criticisms in the 
literature and then proposes guidelines for the citation of dictionaries 
in briefs, arguments, and judicial opinions—with the ultimate goal of 
promoting consistency between the use of dictionaries and textualist 
principles. 
Part I reviews the principles of textualism and how the use of 
dictionaries conflicts with these principles for many of the same 
reasons that some textualist critics fault the use of legislative history. 
Part II then turns to the science of dictionaries and the processes used 
in creating them, identifying additional pitfalls. Part III brings 
together these criticisms and warnings to construct a model of proper 
dictionary usage in textualist argument. Finally, Part IV analyzes that 
model in the context of two cases that involved controversial uses of 
dictionaries.23 
I.  TEXTUALISM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND LEXICOGRAPHY 
The Court’s increased use of dictionaries relates to a broader 
trend within the Court toward the use of textualist methodology in 
statutory and constitutional interpretation.24 For Justices who place 
great emphasis on the objective meaning of words, dictionaries are 
appealing as easy and clear sources of that meaning. 
 
 19. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra Part III.D. 
 21. See, e.g., Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the 
Dictionary when Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 406 (2003) 
(“Dictionaries are less helpful when the inquiry properly extends beyond the word level.”). 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. For a discussion of the lack of judicial guidelines for using dictionaries, see Thumma & 
Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 290. 
 24. Note, supra note 3, at 1440. 
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A.  Textualism and Original Plain Meaning 
Justice Scalia describes the core principle of textualism as the 
belief that “[a] text should not be construed strictly, and it should not 
be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain 
all that it fairly means.”25 Driving this method of interpretation is a 
strong belief that judges are not given providence to create law—a 
statute or constitutional provision means whatever the language in it 
means, nothing more and nothing less. To be a “textualist in good 
standing,” Justice Scalia says, “[o]ne need only hold the belief that 
judges have no authority to pursue [social or policy objectives] or 
write . . . new laws.”26 Justice Scalia is particularly associated with 
originalism, a corollary of textualism focusing on the original intent or 
meaning of the words in question.27 And originalism, particularly 
Justice Scalia’s form of originalism, has seen increased acceptance by 
the Supreme Court during Scalia’s tenure.28 
Like textualism, originalism can take several forms. Some 
originalists focus on the “original intent” of the provision, acquired by 
looking to the recorded intent of the drafters.29 Others, including 
Justice Scalia, focus instead on the “original plain meaning” of the 
provision—the meaning ordinary people would have understood at 
the time of the statute’s adoption, regardless of any secret or 
unknown intent that may have existed in the minds of the provision’s 
framers.30 Justice Scalia describes this method as “new textualism”31 
 
 25. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 23 (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 
(1989) (discussing originalism and comparing it to other philosophies). 
 28. See George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 323 (1995) 
(“Textualist interpretation seems to have gained increased attention, including on the Supreme 
Court, particularly since the arrival of Justice Scalia.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 29. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 
247–55 (2009) (discussing “original intent” originalism and its eventual evolution into “original 
plain meaning” originalism). 
 30. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38 (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I 
look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen 
intended.”); Taylor, supra note 28, at 331 (noting that such conservative thinkers as Justice 
Scalia, Judge Frank Easterbrook, and Professor Richard Epstein subscribe to original meaning 
originalism). Some scholars have pointed to the tension between “plain” and “ordinary” 
meaning, referring to dictionaries as an example of plain meaning that might not be ordinary. 
See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2036–
38 (2005) (arguing that the distinction between these two terms—not generally made by the 
Court—would affect which evidence a court would consider in its analyses). 
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and, in the words of Professor William Eskridge, as the “best, and 
perhaps only legitimate, approach to statutory interpretation.”32 
As the name suggests, all forms of textualism focus on the text 
itself, claiming legitimacy in the idea that judges, when limited to the 
words within the provision to be interpreted, cannot as easily inject 
their own preferences into their interpretations.33 By doing so, 
textualism invokes the democratic value that the people’s legislature, 
not unelected judges, should create the law, and judges should be 
limited to objective interpretational sources of the law’s meaning.34 
Although most textualists, particularly new textualists, reject external 
sources of interpretation such as legislative history, they still accept 
that “the terms, usage, or context of the larger statutory framework 
may help resolve apparent ambiguity.”35 
B.  New Textualists and the Perils of Legislative History 
Textualists—especially new textualists like Justice Scalia—
generally reject legislative history as a source of interpretative 
 
 31. Describing Justice Scalia as the “most notable” of the new textualists, Jason Weinstein 
defines “new textualism” as “a method of statutory interpretation whereby a judge reads a 
statute and asks how the ordinary reader would interpret the text.” Jason Weinstein, Note, 
Against Dictionaries: Using Analogical Reasoning to Achieve a More Restrained Textualism, 38 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 649, 650 (2005). Calling the use of a dictionary a “failed mechanism to 
pinpoint exact parameters of words when it is written to do exactly the opposite,” Weinstein 
argues that new textualists should avoid dictionaries entirely, substituting analogical reasoning 
in their place. Id. at 673. This Note disagrees with a wholesale prohibition on the use of 
dictionaries, instead creating a framework under which dictionaries can be used in a manner 
consistent with textualist principles. See infra Part III. 
 32. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 235 (2d ed. 2006) (describing Justice Scalia’s 
position on new textualism). Although Justice Scalia’s new textualism in particular has seen 
increased acceptance on the Court, this Note addresses textualism generally, given that 
whichever denomination of textualism one might ascribe to, the basic rule of determining the 
objective meaning of statutory language from the text of the statute itself easily suggests the use 
of dictionaries as an objective interpretative tool. This observation is true whether one applies 
“soft plain meaning” textualism, in which the text controls absent “compelling evidence of a 
contrary legislative intent,” id. at 232, or something more akin to Justice Scalia’s new textualism. 
 33. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38–39 (criticizing the concept of a “Living Constitution” as 
an improper method of constitutional interpretation). 
 34. See id. (explaining that nontextualist modes of constitutional interpretation allow 
judges to “trump[] even the statutes of democratic legislatures”). Despite its claims to 
objectivity, textualism has likewise been criticized for selectively using certain interpretive tools 
to reach desired outcomes. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 35. Taylor, supra note 28, at 342–43. 
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meaning.36 Justice Scalia cites four types of issues that make the use of 
legislative history problematic—issues, it turns out, that are similar to 
the problems that arise when dictionaries are relied upon for 
statutory interpretation. 
First, Justice Scalia points to historical practice: focusing on 
legislative history, he claims, was not “the traditional English, and the 
traditional American, practice.”37 Quoting Chief Justice Taney, 
Justice Scalia argues that: 
[T]he only mode in which [the will of Congress] is spoken is in the 
act itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there 
used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon 
the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of 
the times in which it was passed.38 
Justice Scalia asserts that “[e]xtensive use of legislative history in this 
country dates only from about the 1940s,” arguing that such use is a 
new creation inconsistent with traditional American jurisprudence.39 
Second, Justice Scalia argues that legislative history is improper 
because it is external to the statute. This argument relates to elements 
of both Congressional power—Congress only says that which it has 
passed in accordance with Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution40—
and of fair notice. According to Justice Scalia, using legislative intent 
rather than the specific text approved is “one step worse than the 
trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up 
 
 36. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 236 (“Justice Scalia is insistent that judges 
should almost never consult, and never rely on, the legislative history of a statute.”). 
 37. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 30. 
 38. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 236; see also SCALIA, supra note 5, at 35 (“A 
statute, however, has a claim to our attention simply because Article I, section 7 of the 
Constitution provides that since it has been passed by the prescribed majority (with or without 
adequate understanding), it is a law.”). Justice Scalia points out the perils of relying on legislative 
history by quoting a debate on the Senate floor during which the committee chair admitted that 
he had neither helped to write nor read in full the committee report of the bill under 
consideration. The Senate, the transcript points out, neither formally considered nor adopted 
the committee report when adopting the bill itself, yet such a report was likely to be cited were 
the Court to later evaluate the final statute. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 32–34. Justice Scalia 
also points out that this concern would not be remedied even if legislators knew the content of 
the committee reports, because a legislator’s knowledge of what the bill means is “not a 
precondition for the authoritativeness of a statute,” id. at 34, because Article I, Section 7 places 
no such condition on Congress, id. at 35. 
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on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read.”41 To look beyond 
the statute to an external source of meaning is to interpret the text 
according to an understanding not approved by Congress and not 
easily accessible to the governed.42 
Third, Scalia asserts that even if these concerns could be 
addressed, legislative history is an impractical and perhaps impossible 
indicator of congressional intent. Congress is made up of hundreds of 
representatives, all voting for their own reasons, which may or may 
not be expressed in or consistent with the legislative history.43 How is 
a judge to determine what Congress intended? Does Congress ever 
intend only one, unanimous thing?44 
Finally, by means of combining these other arguments, Justice 
Scalia argues that the use of legislative history stands opposed to the 
ideal of judges as simple interpreters of law. On this note, Justice 
Scalia invokes Judge Leventhal’s concern about “looking over the 
heads [of the cocktail party guests] for one’s friends.”45 Because of the 
wide variety of opinions and statements found in most legislative 
history, a judge can cite support for the chosen outcome and 
simultaneously ignore contradictory evidence also found within the 
legislative history. And because legislative history is external to the 
statutory text, a judge can interpret a statute to mean something 
arguably contrary to the text itself, leaving those reading the statute 
without notice of the ultimate meaning.46 Such a practice gives a judge 
an improper opportunity to shape the outcome of a case according to 
his or her own policy preferences. 
C.  How Dictionary Use Is Like Legislative History 
Despite involving a nearly identical set of difficulties and 
objections as legislative history, dictionaries have not received the 
 
 41. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17. 
 42. See id. at 31 (“My Court is frequently told, in briefs and in oral argument, that 
‘Congress said thus-and-so’—when in fact what is being quoted is not the law promulgated by 
Congress, nor even any text endorsed by a single house of Congress, but rather the statement of 
a single committee of a single house, set forth in a committee report.”). 
 43. See Taylor, supra note 28, at 339 (“The argument raised is that it is impossible to speak 
of ‘an’ intent of a multi-member legislature.”). 
 44. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 219 (discussing critiques of legislative 
history which call it “multifaceted, potentially manipulable, and often unfocused and even 
contradictory”). 
 45. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 46. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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same scrutiny from Justice Scalia and other textualists.47 Although 
Part II delves more deeply into the science of dictionaries and the 
jurisprudential problems they raise, this Section first reviews the 
similar problems raised by dictionaries and legislative history. 
First, like legislative history, dictionaries are external sources of 
interpretation.48 It would be useful for interpretative purposes if 
Congress adopted an official dictionary or deputized particular 
dictionaries within the definitions sections of various statutes, but 
“[l]egislators do not consult dictionaries or incorporate by reference 
dictionary definitions in drafting statutes.”49 Without ratification of a 
particular dictionary, the use of such a resource in interpretation is 
necessarily external, given that dictionaries were not created by or 
necessarily consulted by the Congress that adopted the statute. 
Therefore, “[w]hen Congress uses a word, the word means what 
Congress says it means, all the dictionary definitions to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”50 Without knowing which dictionary (or which 
definition within a dictionary) the Court might one day use to 
construe the statute, a citizen cannot be on guard as to what the 
statute means—it may as well be hung up on one of Nero’s poles.51 
Second, dictionaries have not historically been used as 
extensively as the Court (and Justice Scalia in particular) uses them 
 
 47. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 441, 445 (1990) (noting that, unlike legislative history, the text of a statute has passed “a 
difficult set of procedural hurdles and either passed by a two-thirds vote or obtained the 
President’s signature,” but failing to address that dictionaries have not passed such hurdles 
either); see also Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV.  863, 872 (1930) (“A 
legislative intent, undiscoverable in fact, irrelevant if it were discovered, is the last residuum of 
our ‘golden rule.’ It is a queerly amorphous piece of slag. Are we really reduced to such shifts 
that we must fashion monsters and endow them with imaginations in order to understand 
statutes?”). 
 48. For the argument that textualists treat dictionaries as an “inherent part of determining 
the meaning of the text,” making them essentially internal, see Aprill, supra note 3, at 280. 
 49. Id. at 299; see also Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 247 
(1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Congress that passed McCarran-Ferguson was composed 
of neither insurance experts nor dictionary editors.”). Congress has imposed some general rules 
of construction. For example, a statute’s use of a masculine form applies to the feminine as well; 
the use of a singular noun also refers to the plural. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). That statute, originally 
referred to as the “Dictionary Act,” Aprill, supra note 3, at 299 n.134, does not prescribe a 
particular dictionary or the use of any dictionary at all, 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
 50. Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 386. 
Following this logic, Congress could actually create a new meaning for a word through statute, if 
it chose to do so. 
 51. See text accompanying supra note 41. 
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today.52 This, in and of itself, is not necessarily problematic, but 
Justice Scalia criticizes legislative history for this same weakness.53 If 
Justice Scalia can invoke Chief Justice Taney to argue that the use of 
legislative history lacks a traditional basis in the law, why can others 
not invoke, for example, Justice Holmes’s statement that “the 
provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical 
formulas . . . . [and] their significance is vital not formal; it is to be 
gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary”?54 
Finally, dictionaries, like legislative history, can be difficult to use 
effectively, which can give rise to judicial manipulation. Despite their 
aura of authority, dictionaries do not define the one, true meaning of 
a word—they generally provide multiple meanings intended to 
capture the wide breadth of possible usage.55 Similar to legislative 
history, a judge can use a dictionary to pick out from the “cocktail 
party crowd” the meaning that supports the interpretation the judge 
is seeking. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that Justice Scalia in 
particular does exactly this, declaring the dictionary to provide 
objective, clear meaning only when it supports the ideologically 
conservative outcome.56 Professor Ellen Aprill goes so far as to assert 
that “Justice Scalia’s use of dictionaries as a tool of textualism 
appears instrumental indeed, invoked only when it produces the 
desired result.”57 
All in all, the use of dictionaries is very similar to the use of 
legislative history. Reliance on dictionaries pulls in an external source 
 
 52. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text. 
 53. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 30 (discussing the tendency of courts not to use 
legislative history before the 1940s); see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 54. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 
 55. See B.T. SUE ATKINS & MICHAEL RUNDELL, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL 
LEXICOGRAPHY 2 (2008) (“Dictionaries are often perceived as authoritative records of how 
people ‘ought to’ use language, and they are regularly invoked for guidance on ‘correct’ usage. 
They are seen, in other words, as prescriptive texts. Lexicographers have long been 
uncomfortable with this idea . . . .”); HOWARD JACKSON, LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 
21 (2002) (“[W]e all take what the dictionary says as authoritative . . . .”); see also infra Part 
III.B. 
 56. See, e.g., Aprill, supra note 3, at 321 (“To Justice Scalia, dictionary definitions are 
objective and dispositive only when they narrow the power of the federal government.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration 
of Scalia’s Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1389–90 (1999) 
(noting that “Scalia’s opinions generally reflect his theoretical bias toward defining words 
narrowly” and discussing Scalia’s use of dictionaries to construe constitutional language 
narrowly). 
 57. Aprill, supra note 3, at 321. 
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not ratified (or even, in many cases, read or understood) by 
Congress58 and provides judges with the opportunity to selectively 
accept whichever of many conflicting statements conforms to a 
particular policy outcome. Without a principled method of using 
dictionaries in an objective, scientific fashion, it seems difficult to 
accept any usage of dictionaries by textualists. 
II.  THE SCIENCE OF DICTIONARIES 
Having broadly likened the use of dictionaries to reliance on 
legislative history, this Note now examines the many differences 
between them. Far from legitimizing the use of dictionaries as 
compared to the use of legislative history, however, these differences 
actually uncover additional pitfalls concerning dictionary use in 
judicial opinions. This Part discusses how dictionaries are created and 
then addresses the dangers created by the inherent qualities of 
dictionaries.59 
A.  What Is a Dictionary? 
Everyone knows what a dictionary is in the everyday sense; 
dictionaries are “part of the cultural fabric of our society.”60 At its 
most basic, a dictionary is a reference book pertaining to the 
definitions of words.61 But even the notion of “the dictionary” as one 
monolithic concept is troublesome: there are many dictionaries with 
different purposes, focuses, budgets, constraints, and methodologies.62 
Dictionaries can be monolingual or bilingual, and they can focus on 
general knowledge or on a specific trade or cultural area. They can be 
 
 58. Indeed, legislative history might be more legitimate in this regard, given that legislative 
history can at least claim a connection to the legislative process and Congress’s acquiescence to 
its publication. Dictionaries are wholly external. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 32, at 310 
(“Even a textualist might find something of value in legislative history, which might be a more 
democratically legitimate guide to meaning than the commonly deployed dictionaries that so 
fascinate the current Supreme Court.”). 
 59. Though the full history of dictionaries is fascinating, this Note does not discuss it, 
instead touching on historical concepts only insomuch as they affect the use of dictionaries in 
legal interpretation today. For an excellent and detailed discussion of the history of the 
dictionary, see generally Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9. 
 60. JACKSON, supra note 55, at 21. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. (“Compare some of the entries [of different dictionaries], and you soon realise 
that the notion of ‘the dictionary’ as a single text is wide of the mark. What distinguishes them is 
more notable than what they have in common.”). 
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unabridged or concise—and everything in between.63 Dictionaries can 
focus on different kinds of readers as well: some dictionaries are 
intended for native speakers, some seek to translate, and some are 
designed to help new speakers learn the language.64 These differences 
require decisions early in the planning stages of dictionary creation 
that affect the sources chosen for the dictionary, the methodology 
used in constructing definitions, and the words and definitions 
included.65 
B.  How Dictionaries Are Created 
Understanding the unique pitfalls presented by dictionaries 
requires an understanding of the creation of dictionaries and of 
lexicography—the science of determining the meaning of words.66 
Though technology has changed the process considerably, the 
creation of a dictionary has always involved amassing examples of 
usage, which requires a tremendous amount of historical research.67 
Prior to the 1980s, the primary method of assembling these examples 
was a hands-on process of creating a catalog of “citation evidence.”68 
A “citation” is a “short extract from a text which provides evidence 
for a word, phrase, usage, or meaning in authentic use.”69 Such 
extracts were collected by hand, sometimes using volunteers, and 
until the late twentieth century, were recorded on index cards and 
kept in a file.70 Here, one of the first editorial judgments of dictionary 
 
 63. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 24–25 (detailing the properties of different 
types of dictionaries). 
 64. See id. (listing specific considerations for, among other dictionary properties, a 
dictionary’s language, coverage, size, and purpose). 
 65. See id. at 27–28 (discussing the various decisions made during the creation of a 
dictionary). 
 66. This Note discusses only briefly the deep underpinnings of lexicography here, as a 
broader overview of the process is sufficient to display potential problems dictionaries pose for 
legal scholars. For a good discussion of the lexicographical processes utilized by modern 
dictionary editors, see, for example, Aprill, supra note 3, at 283–300. 
 67. See SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 44 
(2d ed. 2001) (discussing the massive volume of information that lexicographers must sort 
through and the degree of scholarship required to complete the process). 
 68. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 48, 50. 
 69. Id. at 48. 
 70. Id. at 50. Some of the vast citation files are still found only in paper form because the 
cards cannot be scanned into a computer due to faint type or handwriting. See LANDAU, supra 
note 67, at 190 (describing the formation of citation files). 
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creation is evident: which citations are included?71 Selecting both the 
sources for citations and the individual citations themselves involves a 
“big subjective element,” and “human readers tend to notice what is 
remarkable and ignore what is typical, [creating] a bias towards the 
novel or idiosyncratic usages which inevitably catch the reader’s 
eye.”72 
The arrival of computers and databases dramatically changed the 
methodology used to create dictionaries, but it left the fundamental 
question of source selection similarly subjective. Nowadays, most 
dictionary authors create a “corpus,” which is a collection of whole or 
partial texts or recorded speech stored and indexed electronically so 
that individual words can be found quickly.73 Some corpora contain 
millions of words, and “may include all or parts of the running text of 
newspapers, books of fiction and nonfiction, magazines, scholarly and 
literary works, transcripts of television or radio programs, and 
unscripted speech.”74 Citation files, however, are still utilized to some 
extent in modern dictionaries.75 
Even with corpora, some choices remain. A corpus is intended to 
be a sample of the language, representing the whole language in much 
the same way as a statistical sample is meant to represent the 
population.76 Like any scientific research involving samples, the 
representativeness of the sample affects the viability of the results 
 
 71. See Hayakawa, supra note 1, at 71 (“The writing of a dictionary, therefore, is not a task 
of setting up authoritative statements about the ‘true meanings’ of words, but a task of 
recording, to the best of one’s ability, what various words have meant to authors in the distant or 
immediate past.”). 
 72. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 52. 
 73. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 190. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. at 193 (“However important corpora are, they cannot be as up-to-the-minute as 
citation files, because it takes time to convert and process text and to incorporate it into the rest 
of the corpus. So citation collection is still important for finding new words and senses and for 
spotting trends in usage . . . .”); see also id. at 182 (“The native-speaker dictionaries have been 
slower to make use of corpora than [English-as-a-second-language] dictionaries . . . .”). But see 
ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 53 (“Citation reading continues to have value, especially 
as a form of lexicographic training. But now that most written texts . . . are available in digital 
form, it has become a more marginal way of collecting linguistic data.”). 
 76. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 54 (discussing the impossibility of collecting 
every instance of the use of a modern language, thus making the corpus a sample). 
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drawn from it. Dictionary makers must determine which sources to 
include in the corpus and how large it will be.77  
Ensuring that the corpus is truly representative of the language 
can be difficult for a number of reasons. First, skewing can occur with 
the inclusion of technical sources, which may use some words at a 
frequency vastly greater than in the language as a whole. For 
example, the British National Corpus shows the same number of hits 
for “unfortunate” as it does for “mucosa,” due to the inclusion of a 
large amount of data from Gut: The Journal of Gastroenterology and 
Hepatology.78 As with most statistical data, a larger number of sources 
helps a corpus to avoid skewing based on outliers.79 
Second, a majority of meaningful communication is spoken—
particularly that which is unscripted and conversational—yet the 
majority of the sample for a corpus necessarily comes from published 
writing, meaning that a corpus will overrepresent written language.80 
Third, the corpus “does not favour ‘high quality’ language”81 in the 
way that citation files did in the past, because a corpus does not rely 
on selections of specific passages and sentences which represent the 
best usage of the language.82 Yet, paradoxically, corpora may in some 
ways be underrepresentative of “lower quality” language as well. If 
there is “no real distinction between formal and informal usage 
except among the privileged and highly educated,”83 then any corpus 
focusing more on formal usages (which are more likely to be seen in 
print) would necessarily underrepresent the speech patterns of those 
with less education.84 This issue is relevant to the use of dictionaries in 
 
 77. See id. at 57 (noting the decisions that corpus designers must make). But see id. (“For 
major languages like English, data sparseness is a thing of the past and corpus size has almost 
ceased to be an issue.”). 
 78. Id. at 69. Although this problem can largely be avoided with due care, seemingly 
representative sources can be skewed simply by, for example, including a work of fiction in 
which the main character is a neurosurgeon whose work is described in technical detail. See id. 
(giving as an example the novel Saturday by Ian McEwan). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 77–78 (discussing the difficulties of recording “spontaneous, unscripted 
speech”). In the past, volunteers were recruited to create tape-recorded conversations to 
generate such samples for the corpus—but such information is costly. Id. at 77. 
 81. Id. at 55. 
 82. See id. (“The whole point of using corpora is to avoid pre-judging the data and 
choosing texts because you approve of them in some way.”). 
 83. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 257. 
 84. It is for this reason, Landau surmises, that WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY (1961) dropped the “informal” label, causing a huge controversy in the process. 
See id. at 258 (“The editors may have felt that they could not define or know the attitudes of the 
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analysis because anyone looking for the ordinary meaning of words 
wants to know how the average user would understand them—and 
such skewing affects the dictionary’s ability to represent the average 
user. At the same time, the corpus method avoids some bias by not 
depending as much on the “collective judgments of a large number of 
people over an extended period of time” in the same way as a citation 
file, which requires that the creators select each individual quote to be 
included, as opposed to whole sources.85 
Creating the database (whether of citation cards or a corpus), 
however, only begins the process of authoring a dictionary. The 
lexicographer must then divide up the various meanings of a word 
into manageable units.86 The process involves research, but also 
decisionmaking: the primary job of the lexicographer in creating a 
dictionary is to determine meanings of words, and to determine what 
different meanings a word might have. The line between one meaning 
and another is seldom clear, which leaves much of the final 
determination to the experienced judgment of the editorial staff.87 As 
Sidney Landau, editor of the Cambridge Dictionary of American 
English and one of the foremost scholars on lexicography, puts it, 
“[a]ll definitions of things are compromises between specific accuracy 
and breadth of inclusiveness. . . . [N]o definition can take in all of the 
particular things referred to by the word defined.”88 Ultimately, it 
“comes down to the lexicographer[s] exercising their informed 
judgment in the face of the evidence they have to work with.”89 
Sometimes that judgment even involves the inclusion of eccentric 
uses made by “established writers of the literary canon.”90 
 
class of people to whom some usages would be informal. . . . In deciding not to use the informal 
label, [Webster’s Third] simply declined to represent a particular social class.”). See generally 
HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD: PHILIP GOVE’S CONTROVERSIAL 
DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS (1994) (discussing the controversy surrounding the changes in 
presentation and research made in creating Webster’s Third); infra note 104 and accompanying 
text. 
 85. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 192. 
 86. Id. at 200. 
 87. See JACKSON, supra note 55, at 91 (explaining that lexicographers must make final 
judgments based on their experience and the available evidence); LANDAU, supra note 67, at 62 
(“All dictionary makers are sometimes faced with the necessity of making decisions without full 
information, which is sometimes impossible to obtain.”). 
 88. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 182. 
 89. JACKSON, supra note 55, at 91. 
 90. See LANDAU, supra note 67, at 203 (discussing the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
deliberate focus on inclusion of the works of authors such as T.S. Eliot, James Joyce, and 
Virginia Woolf, even including unique uses of words by prolific authors). 
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Even after lines are drawn between meanings, several factors can 
influence the dictionary’s final form. Space in a dictionary is a zero-
sum game—including one word or usage necessarily reduces the 
space available for others.91 Dictionary editors cannot include 
everything in the language, and they are forced to make choices 
concerning how detailed to make an entry and which entries to omit 
entirely.92 The creation of a dictionary is a “pragmatic enterprise” 
limited at every stage by constraints of space, budget, and time.93 
C.  Distinctive Traits of Dictionaries 
Sidney Landau categorizes dictionaries according to a number of 
criteria: the number of languages contained; the variety of English 
addressed; the age, purpose, and primary language of the users; the 
manner of funding; the period of time meant to be covered; and the 
size and scope of the work.94 In addition, dictionaries differ in how 
descriptive or prescriptive they intend to be. Each of these elements 
can affect the resulting dictionary and its usefulness in legal analysis. 
 
 91. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 20–21 (“Space is finite . . . . Even the 20-volume 
[Oxford English Dictionary] makes no claim to include all the vocabulary of English. Inevitably, 
then, the average one-volume dictionary can cover only a small proportion of the vocabulary of 
a language.” (citation omitted)). Online dictionaries could potentially reduce some of the size 
limitations present in printed dictionaries. See Erin McKean Redefines the Dictionary, TED 
(Mar. 2007), http://www.ted.com/talks/erin_mckean_redefines_the_dictionary.html (discussing 
the future of dictionaries). 
 92. Clarke D. Cunningham and his colleagues describe this well, noting that: 
Even when a dictionary does record a usage that corresponds to what appears to be a 
legally relevant meaning, it is dangerous to rely on the way that usage is 
characterized, categorized, and ordered. Dictionary entries are severely limited by 
time and space constraints; lexicographers must prepare thousands of dictionary 
entries, each one of which must fit into a very small space and predetermined format. 
Whether a particular usage is listed first or last in an entry has no bearing on whether 
it is the “plainest” meaning for the word in the context in question. 
Clark D. Cunningham, Judith N. Levi, Georgia M. Green & Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Plain Meaning 
and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1615 (1994) (book review). 
 93. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 56; see also LANDAU, supra note 67, at 357 
(“Considerations of available space always place practical limits on the number of entries that 
can be accommodated, especially in a one-volume dictionary. . . . If a college dictionary did not 
limit its entry count, it would run out of space somewhere in the letter D . . . .”); Cunningham et 
al., supra note 92, at 1615 (discussing the practical limitations lexicographers face in assembling 
word usages). Landau also notes that because dictionaries are expected to define every word 
used to define other words, it becomes almost a necessity to develop a complete word list before 
beginning to define any of the words. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 357. 
 94. See generally LANDAU, supra note 67, at 8–42 (discussing the different aspects of 
dictionaries). 
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1. Intended User and Purpose.  As mentioned, many different 
kinds of dictionaries exist, each with a different purpose and intended 
audience, and the intended audience will dramatically affect every 
stage of the dictionary-creation process.95 Trade dictionaries differ 
significantly from general dictionaries in the types of sources from 
which they derive their research.96 Dictionaries designed to teach a 
language tend to describe words in a very different (and often 
simpler) manner than general-use dictionaries.97 
2. Prescription Versus Description.  One great debate throughout 
the history of lexicography has been that of prescription versus 
description.98 The older, more conventional perspective, prescription, 
“assumes that there is a correctness in English languages as absolute 
as that in elementary mathematics.”99 Adherents to this school of 
thought presume there is a correct way and an incorrect way to use a 
particular word. A prescriptive dictionary “treats the entries in a 
dictionary as representing the ‘proper’ way to use English, rather than 
representing how language actually is being used.”100 Descriptive 
dictionaries, on the other hand, embrace the opposite philosophy: 
they simply seek to describe “what members of the speech 
community do when they communicate with one another.”101 Much of 
the disagreement between proponents of these two methods can be 
framed as a battle between grammarians seeking to define the 
language and linguists seeking to observe and describe it.102 
 
 95. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 96. See, e.g., LANDAU, supra note 67, at 32 (“[S]ubject-field dictionaries often have a 
normative purpose as well as an informative one, and they tend to be more encyclopedic in 
content.”). 
 97. Id. at 16. 
 98. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 242–44. 
 99. MORTON, supra note 84, at 139. 
 100. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 242. 
 101. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 2. 
 102. See, e.g., MORTON, supra note 84, at 138–42 (describing the struggle between 
prescriptive grammarians and descriptive linguists). The shift toward description over 
prescription began in the mid-twentieth century, as demonstrated by a publication of the 
National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) called The English Language Arts, which 
supported the idea that language is naturally in constant change and that correctness of the 
language “rests on usage.” LANDAU, supra note 67, at 254 (discussing the movement in the 
1940s and 1950s toward an understanding of English that embraced natural change and 
evolution of the language); cf. MORTON, supra note 84, at 140–41 (discussing NCTE’s polling of 
educated writers, businessmen, and others, finding that “grammars and usage books were much 
more conservative than the practices of educated users”). 
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Modern dictionaries generally follow the descriptive 
methodology,103 though some tension still exists in this regard. For 
example, much of the controversy over Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary centered on how far toward the descriptive 
end of the spectrum it landed—omitting for the first time even 
normative usage cues such as the “informal” label.104 
It might be tempting to disregard the discussion of description 
versus prescription, given that, by and large, description has won the 
battle, and modern dictionaries are clearly more descriptive than 
those of earlier times.105 But because the Court often invokes 
contemporaneous dictionaries, prescriptive dictionaries find their way 
into Court opinions,106 raising the question of whether a dictionary 
designed to dictate proper usage can reasonably be used to 
demonstrate plain meaning. 
3. Size and Scope.  Dictionaries come in many different sizes, 
designed for many different uses.107 The entire English lexicon is 
 
 103. Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 243; see also Aprill, supra note 3, at 284 
(“Lexicographers did not always prefer description to prescription.”); Erin McKean Redefines 
the Dictionary, supra note 91 (“I don’t want to be a traffic cop. . . . So if I had to think of some 
kind of occupation as a metaphor for my work [as a lexicographer], I would much rather be a 
fisherman. I wanna throw my big net into the deep blue ocean of English and see what 
marvelous creatures I can drag up from the bottom.”). 
 104. The controversy over Webster’s Third is not covered in great detail here, but entire 
books have been devoted to the subject. See generally MORTON, supra note 84 (covering the 
entire making, controversy, and legacy of Webster’s Third); DICTIONARIES AND THAT 
DICTIONARY (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962) (containing dozens of essays and 
critiques of Webster’s Third). Justice Scalia even disposed of an unfavorable definition from 
Webster’s Third by referring to the controversy discrediting the dictionary. See MCI Telecomms. 
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1994) (disregarding the Webster’s Third definition of 
the word “modify”); see also William Safire, On Language: Scalia v. Merriam-Webster, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Nov. 20, 2004, at 30, 32 (discussing the MCI case and Scalia’s argument against 
Webster’s Third). Despite Justice Scalia’s aversion to it in MCI, Webster’s Third is the Court’s 
“most popular usage dictionary, appearing in 102 opinions through the 1997–1998 term.” 
Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 262–63. 
 105. At the same time, some modern dictionaries are more descriptive or prescriptive than 
others. For example, the American Heritage Dictionary seeks to chart a more prescriptive path 
than Webster’s Third. See Andrew Adam Newman, Wordsmiths: They Also Serve Who Only 
Vote on ‘Ain’t,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at B11 (“American Heritage was intended as a more 
prescriptive response to Webster’s Third, and to this day dictionaries strive to strike that balance 
between guarding and updating the language.”). Interestingly, Justice Scalia serves as a member 
of the American Heritage Dictionary’s usage panel, helping to determine the “correct” meaning 
of words in this more-prescriptive dictionary. Merriam-Webster has no plans to implement a 
usage panel for updates to Webster’s Third. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 16. 
 107. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
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estimated to be about four million words,108 yet even an unabridged 
dictionary might contain only 450,000 of them.109 Indeed, despite the 
common misconception that unabridged dictionaries contain the 
entire language, the term, in practice, “has meant a dictionary of 
400,000 to 600,000 entries.”110 So-called college dictionaries, by far the 
most popular general-use dictionaries in the United States, are 
smaller, typically containing only 160,000 to 180,000 entries.111 Desk 
dictionaries are smaller still; they often contain only 60,000 to 80,000 
entries.112 A one-volume dictionary, of any size, “can cover only a 
small portion of the vocabulary of a language.”113 Although the 
absence of a particular word from a particular dictionary might tell 
the reader something, it does not indicate concretely that the word is 
not within the vocabulary of the language. 
For the purposes of legal analysis, the statutory or constitutional 
words in question are generally acknowledged to be part of the 
language; it is their definitions that are in dispute. The size and scope 
of the dictionary matter here as well: smaller dictionaries “not only 
have fewer entries but their definitions are briefer and fewer senses 
are given for each word.”114 This means that a judge searching for the 
existence of a particular meaning may find it missing in a college 
dictionary even though an unabridged dictionary from the same time 
period might contain that usage.115 And lack of space can lead to loss 
of meaning on both the research and definition sides of dictionary 
creation, because citations are expensive to collect and corpora 
expensive to compile. The number of sources that can be referenced 
 
 108. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 28. 
 109. See id. at 29 (referring specifically to Webster’s Third, which was published in 1961); see 
also Aprill, supra note 3, at 294–95 (containing a similar discussion of dictionary size). 
 110. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 30; see also ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 20 
(“Even the 20-volume [Oxford English Dictionary] makes no claim to include all the vocabulary 
of English.”). 
 111. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 30. 
 112. Id. at 31. 
 113. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 21. 
 114. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 31 (referring specifically to desk dictionaries); see also id. at 
377 (discussing the strict length requirements often imposed on definers by dictionary editors). 
 115. See Aprill, supra note 3, at 295–96 (noting that “unlike the [Oxford English Dictionary] 
or Webster’s Third, the definitions listed for ‘exercise’ in the college edition of Webster’s New 
World Dictionary of the American Language do not include any reference to the practice of 
religion”). Compare AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 97 (4th 
ed. 2000) (including under the definition of “arms,” the example of “troops bearing arms”), with 
AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 77 (4th ed. 2002) (lacking this specific example, 
with the entire definition including fewer military connotations). 
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depends on the budget of the dictionary maker.116 All in all, a court 
looking to see if a particular word could be used in a particular way 
should use as thorough a dictionary as possible, lest the meaning in 
question be cut solely due to issues of space or budget. 
4. Time Lag.  Whether a textualist seeks original intent or 
original plain meaning of a statute, the relevant time period is the one 
contemporary to the drafting of the provision. Therefore, originalists 
generally search for definitions published around the time of the 
relevant language.117 
Yet, as this discussion demonstrates, creating a dictionary 
involves a tremendous amount of work—it takes time. And while that 
time passes, language is a “moving target.”118 Because of the 
“inevitable time delay between collection of citations [or assembling 
of the corpus] and publication of the dictionary, dictionaries must lag 
behind current use of the language.”119 Thus, invoking a dictionary 
published the same year as a statute would actually involve using a 
definition from several years prior. And usage can change quickly. As 
Professor Aprill points out, the 1992 edition of the American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language defines “computer” as “[a] device 
that computes, especially a programmable electronic machine that 
performs high-speed mathematical or logical operations or that 
assembles, stores, correlates, or otherwise processes information.”120 
That definition is technically correct, but it is insufficient for the 
modern understanding (even in 1992) of a computer’s function.121 
 
 116. Cf. Richard W. Bailey, Introduction to DICTIONARIES OF ENGLISH, at v (Richard W. 
Bailey ed., 1987) (“It would take seven hours or more for a reader to mark the twenty or thirty 
new words in a single issue of the New York Times at an estimated cost of sixty dollars; 
recording and filing the data would cost very probably forty dollars. Each quotation in the file 
would cost very probably three to five dollars.”). In terms of space within the actual book itself, 
some unabridged dictionaries choose to spend some margin space on pictures. See, e.g., 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 115 (reserving 
margin space for pictures on each page, whether or not pictures actually appear there). 
 117. See, e.g., text accompanying infra note 212. 
 118. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 47. 
 119. Aprill, supra note 3, at 287 (“[D]ictionaries are out of date by the time they are 
published.”). 
 120. Id. at 288 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
389 (3d ed. 1992)). 
 121. And this problem is not resolved even in the Fourth Edition. See AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 115, at 380 (including the 
identical definition of “computer,” despite being well into the “computer age,” which the book 
also defines on the same page). Interestingly, this edition contains a number of relatively recent 
computer-related terms, such as “computerized axial tomography,” “computer literacy,” and 
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Courts should take this time lag into account when citing to 
dictionary definitions—a dictionary published in 1950 does not 
capture the language from 1950 but rather that of some years 
before.122 
5. Time Period Covered.  In addition to the question of time lag, 
the temporal purpose of the dictionary must be taken into account. 
Dictionaries can be synchronic or diachronic—meaning that they can 
purport to represent the language at one particular time or over a 
span of time.123 In modern dictionaries, this choice is essentially 
determined by what materials are included in the corpus and citation 
files.124 Nearly all one-volume dictionaries made for commercial 
purposes in the United States and Britain are synchronic, including 
the Supreme Court’s most-cited dictionary, Webster’s Third.125 In 
reality, this distinction is more of a spectrum, and “no dictionary can 
be purely synchronic, since it takes years to produce any dictionary, 
and even synchronic dictionaries include some archaic forms.”126 
Just as accepted modern practice does not resolve the debate 
surrounding the use of prescriptive versus descriptive dictionaries,127 
the fact that most contemporary dictionaries are synchronic does not 
entirely eliminate the issue of time period covered. The Court often 
 
“computer-aided design.” Id. This example demonstrates that adding new words to a dictionary 
may, at times, be easier than accounting for changes in the meanings of older words. 
 122. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that dictionaries, particularly older ones, are 
known to copy each other—so a dictionary from 1850 may include research from the 1830s, and 
may simply copy another dictionary from 1830 that is based upon research from the early 1800s. 
See, e.g., Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 
2189 (2003) (noting that Noah Webster “borrowed from earlier dictionaries,” including, at 
times, “entry words, definitions, and quotations” without acknowledgement). 
 123. See LANDAU, supra note 67, at 28 (discussing the differences between synchronic and 
diachronic dictionaries). 
 124. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 71 (discussing examples of synchronic and 
diachronic corpora). 
 125. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 27; see also supra note 104. It should be noted, however, 
that “larger synchronic dictionaries such as [Webster’s Third] take in a broader band of time 
than smaller works.” LANDAU, supra note 67, at 27. Historical dictionaries, such as the Oxford 
English Dictionary, require “a fully diachronic corpus,” like the Oxford Historical Corpus, 
which covers twelve centuries. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 71. 
 126. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 28; see also ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 71 
(“Essentially, corpus-builders have to decide ‘how diachronic’ their corpus needs to be in order 
to support the kind of lexicography they will be doing.”); supra Part II.C.4. 
 127. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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consults older and sometimes obscure dictionaries128 and should be 
careful, for example, in using etymological dictionaries, which are 
“specialized diachronic dictionaries,”129 or historical dictionaries 
designed to represent vast periods of time. 
6. Lexigraphic Versus Contextual Analysis.  Many words have 
only one meaning.130 Yet “[t]he more common a word is, the more 
likely it is to have multiple meanings,” and those common words 
“make up the bulk of most texts.”131 Determining the boundaries 
between those different meanings is both highly subjective and 
contextual. “The reality,” the Oxford Guide to Practical Lexicography 
states, “turns out to be less clear-cut than the picture presented in 
dictionaries.”132 The nature of dictionaries allows them to be used in a 
lexigraphic manner, that is, devoid of all context. Yet context is 
essential to analysis. 
Discussing linguists’ explanation for how people derive meaning 
from sentences, Professor Craig Hoffman notes that “[l]inguists 
hypothesize that humans are born with a certain ‘genetic endowment’ 
that predisposes us to use language,”133 and that this skill facilitates 
the internalization of certain unspoken rules about structure and 
meaning, which allow readers to understand sentences when words or 
phrases are unclear.134 This, in turn, makes consideration of the 
surrounding context essential to actually understanding what a 
sentence means. Using a lexicographic analysis is simply taking a 
word out of a sentence and defining it.135 The better method is to view 
words within their context—to “parse the statutory sentence and to 
 
 128. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790–91 (2008) (reviewing 
dictionaries from the 1700s and early 1800s to determine the meaning of the Second 
Amendment). 
 129. LANDAU, supra note 67, at 27. 
 130. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 264. 
 131. Id. at 265–66. 
 132. Id. at 272. Even the dictionaries’ authors themselves have, at times, acknowledged the 
inherently subjective nature of dictionaries. See, e.g., Geoffrey Nunberg, Usage in The American 
Heritage Dictionary, in THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE, supra note 115, at xxviii (“Custom can provide precedents and criticism can 
provide principles, but each has to be evaluated at the bar of opinion.”). 
 133. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 408. 
 134. See id. at 407–08 (explaining the complex inner working of sentence structure and 
noting that all fluent speakers seem to inherently understand sentences even without 
referencing such rules). 
 135. See ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 264 (describing lexicographers’ goal of 
identifying and describing “word senses”). 
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explore the syntactic relationships among its constituents.”136 
Dictionaries, therefore, “are less helpful when the inquiry properly 
extends beyond the word level,”137 as statutory interpretation always 
does. 
III.  A FRAMEWORK FOR TEXTUALIST USE OF DICTIONARIES 
The numerous complications related to judicial use of 
dictionaries do not necessarily mean that dictionaries cannot be used 
in a manner consistent with textualism—but the Court should account 
for these factors when citing to dictionaries in textualist analysis. This 
Part proposes a framework for the use of dictionaries in textualist 
analysis of both statutes and constitutional provisions. 
First, in order to have a coherent framework, it is important to 
annunciate a general theory under which a dictionary is used for 
construing legal language—that is, what is the purpose of using a 
dictionary to look up a word? As the preceding discussion has shown, 
a dictionary is the result of extensive research and academic judgment 
and, when published, is the end-product-for-the-masses of research 
into the lexicon in much the same way that an encyclopedia article on 
nuclear fusion is the mass-marketed version of research into nuclear 
physics. In invoking a dictionary to define a word, one is not really 
searching for what the dictionary says, but rather what the word 
means within the lexicon. The dictionary, then, is simply the window 
through which one seeks to find that meaning. Ultimately, a court 
using a dictionary is allowing it to stand in as a proxy for the lexicon. 
But because the end goal is finding the correct meaning within the 
lexicon—not the dictionary—the limitations of dictionaries must be 
recognized lest the court find the answer to the wrong question. 
Dictionaries are proxies, and they can be good ones or bad ones. The 
following framework seeks to account for the limitations that make 
dictionaries, at times, bad proxies for the lexicon and to provide ways 
to make them better.138 
 
 136. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 402. 
 137. Id. at 406. 
 138. Some of these rules have been suggested in one way or another in one of several 
previous articles on dictionaries and the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 21, at 
402 (discussing the role of context); Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2177–78 (discussing the 
differences in meaning that can be difficult to ascertain from older dictionaries). My goal here is 
to bring together these suggestions in one cohesive collection in much the same style of 
Professor H. Jefferson Powell’s Rules for Originalists. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, Rules 
for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987) (collecting fourteen rules for the responsible use of 
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A.  Use Contextual Analysis Only 
Dictionaries are inherently acontextual—they focus on 
individual words, devoid of the meaning created by the words and 
sentences around them.139 Justice Scalia himself has mentioned the 
need for considering context in the use of dictionaries. In Smith v. 
United States,140 Justice Scalia excoriated the majority’s construction 
of the word “use” as inconsistent with the clear context of the statute 
in question.141 Instead of simply picking a word out and defining it, as 
Justice Scalia claims the majority did in Smith, or as he himself could 
be said to have done in District of Columbia v. Heller,142 judges should 
use dictionaries with the understanding that words “never stand by 
themselves,” but rather “derive their meaning from context and their 
background in the relevant culture.”143 Without context, a word is 
meaningless. And without considering context, so too is the use of a 
dictionary to define a single statutory term. 
Professor Hoffman describes two contrasting methods in which 
the Court might use the dictionary: the “definition” method, which 
involves defining words the reader of the statute might not know, and 
the “verification” method, wherein the Court verifies that a word 
could have a definition that the Court is assigning to it.144 Hoffman 
argues that verification is dangerous because by using a dictionary to 
see if a word could mean what the Court is hoping it might mean, the 
Court is neglecting to “parse the statutory sentence as a first step in 
 
history in constitutional interpretation). Though Professor Powell’s article does not address 
dictionaries, its analysis of the use of historical evidence in originalist constitutional 
interpretation is similar in purpose to this Note—as is some of the advice. See, e.g., id. at 660 
(“[T]he turn to history does not obviate the personal responsibility of the originalist interpreter 
for the positions he takes, because historical research itself, when undertaken responsibly, 
requires of the interpreter the constant exercise of judgment.”). 
 139. See Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2206 (“Dictionaries by their very nature do not provide 
the precise meaning of a word as it is used in a particular context.”). Judge Randolph refers to 
dictionaries as “word zoos” because “[o]ne can observe an animal’s features in the zoo, but one 
still cannot be sure how the animal will behave in its native surroundings.” A. Raymond 
Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 71, 74 (1994). 
 140. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
 141. See id. at 241–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We are dealing here not with a technical word 
or an ‘artfully defined’ legal term, but with common words that are . . . inordinately sensitive to 
context.” (citation omitted)); see also infra Part IV.A. 
 142. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); see also infra Part IV.B. 
 143. Taylor, supra note 28, at 364 (quoting CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 114 (1990)). 
 144. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 402. 
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its linguistic analysis,” leading it to miss contextual clues which might 
have allowed it to better understand the intended meaning of the 
language.145 This distinction is helpful for considering the role of 
context in textualist analysis: if a court is looking for the honest, true 
meaning of a word within a statute (presuming there is such a thing as 
a true meaning), then the context should control over an external 
source such as a dictionary. Indeed, the drafter of the language could 
use a completely new word, or use an old word in a new and possibly 
“incorrect” way—and the context would still control its meaning.146 
B.  Establish Only Outer Boundaries 
Building upon the previous rule, courts should only use 
dictionaries to establish outer boundaries of what a word could (or 
could not) mean—not to determine one true and right meaning.147 
The basic limitations of lexicography make such a rule necessary. 
First, dictionaries are the result of subjective processes at several 
different levels from the choice of data sources to the development of 
distinct usages for each word.148 In addition, dictionaries—even 
unabridged dictionaries—function under limits on size and scope that 
can ultimately lead to the omission of a word or a particular meaning 
of a word.149 And due to problems such as time lag,150 which even 
when accounted for is relatively indeterminate, one can never be 
certain that the absence of a definition in a particular dictionary 
means that the definition is absent from the lexicon itself. Thus, 
dictionaries, even when accounting for all of these issues, should be 
used only to say what a word could mean, not what it must mean—
they can only establish outer boundaries.151 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Note, supra note 3, at 1452 (“[D]ictionaries should occupy a space at the beginning 
rather than at the end of the interpretative process.”); see also Solan, supra note 30, at 2056 
(“The problem with using dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of a word . . . is that 
the purpose of a dictionary is to determine the outer boundaries of appropriate usage for each 
entry.”). 
 148. See supra notes 76–77, 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 150. See supra Part II.C.4. 
 151. See Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 9, at 296 (“Although dictionaries cannot 
provide the end point in defining terms, dictionaries are a proper and useful source in 
determining what a word may mean.”). This is not to say that a court would not ultimately 
decide what a word means in the context of a statute—indeed, that is the job of the court in 
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C.  Use Contemporaneous Research on Word Meaning 
New textualist judges, such as Justice Scalia, have been generally 
consistent with their interpretive theory by using dictionaries 
published around the time of a provision’s enactment.152 But proper 
usage is complicated due to the inherent qualities of dictionaries.153 
Language is a “moving target,”154 and citing a dictionary from 1787 to 
reflect the common understanding at the time the Constitution was 
written is actually to cite research from some years before 1787—the 
sources used could potentially date back decades.155 Language 
changes can occur rapidly, as evidenced by the change in noun 
capitalization between the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights 
in 1789—two documents written closely in time, yet utilizing different 
rules for capitalization of nouns.156 
It can be very difficult to determine the time frame in which a 
dictionary was created, however.157 As such, courts (and litigants) 
should only use dictionaries to establish an outer boundary—
consistent with the “areas of meaning”158 mentioned above—by 
examining various dictionaries from the years surrounding a 
provision. Agreement among several such dictionaries would seem to 
indicate a consistency of usage. 
D.  Justify the Choice of Dictionary and Definition 
What makes a dictionary reliable? According to the Oxford 
Guide to Practical Lexicography, a reliable dictionary “is one whose 
 
statutory or constitutional interpretation. Instead, this Section argues that the dictionary itself 
should not be used to provide a dispositive meaning of a word. 
 152. See, e.g., infra Part IV.B. 
 153. See supra Part II.C.4–5. 
 154. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 47. 
 155. See supra Part II.C.4. 
 156. The real question, perhaps, is which printing of the Constitution to consider. The rules 
regarding capitalization seemed to be in such flux at the time that different printings of the 
Constitution from early in the Republic have been found to have numerous differences in 
capitalization and punctuation. See Denys P. Myers, History of the Printed Archetype of the 
Constitution of the United States of America, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 217, 240 (2008) (“The 
Committee of Style and Arrangement allowed [Jacob] Shallus to capitalize every noun in his 
engrossing but it was restrained in using initial capitals in the printed copy for the Federal 
Convention.”). 
 157. See supra Part II.C.4. 
 158. S.I. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 57–58 (4th ed. 1978) (noting 
that dictionaries are useful not for finding one true perfect meaning but rather for determining 
“areas of meaning” surrounding a word). 
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generalizations about word behavior approximate closely to the ways 
in which people normally use and understand language when 
engaging in real communicative acts (such as writing novels or 
business reports, reading newspapers, or having conversations).”159 
Given the complicated research and deliberation required to create a 
dictionary, it stands to reason that not all dictionaries are created 
equal.160 
Further, even dictionaries of equal quality can be designed for 
substantially different purposes. Is a college dictionary sufficient to 
support an assertion about the absence of a particular meaning? 
Probably not, especially when a contemporaneous unabridged 
dictionary does contain that meaning.161 Yet even very recently the 
Supreme Court has cited collegiate dictionaries to demonstrate the 
absence of a particular word meaning.162 Though specific cases might 
present exceptions, an originalist seeking to understand the breadth 
of a word’s plain meaning would generally want to consult a 
respected unabridged, contemporary, synchronic dictionary. 
Furthermore, the Court should actually justify its choice of 
dictionary and usage explicitly, stepping out from behind the aura of 
authority dictionaries generally provide to explain why a particular 
dictionary is well suited for the task to which it is being applied. The 
Court rarely does this, generally noting at most the contemporaneous 
publication date.163 Instead, the Court should make “at least some 
prima facie argument about the relevance of that particular 
dictionary” to the question at hand.164 Moreover, the Court should 
demonstrate why its chosen dictionary is reliable, suitably 
contemporary and complete, and duly representative of the language 
 
 159. ATKINS & RUNDELL, supra note 55, at 45. 
 160. As mentioned, Justice Scalia has used this argument to dismiss Webster’s Third despite 
it being the Court’s most commonly cited dictionary. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 162. See, e.g., Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 n.10 (2010) (noting that “specified” is 
not synonymous with “implied” or “anticipated” and citing WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 1116 (1974) for support). 
 163. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008) (seeking the 
eighteenth-century meaning of “arms” by looking to dictionaries from 1771, 1773, and 1828). 
 164. Note, supra note 3, at 1453. This suggestion also carries with it the need to justify the 
use of any dictionary, as it “is not always easy to tell when a statute is ambiguous.” LAWRENCE 
M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 93 (1993); see also Taylor, supra note 28, at 356 (“The 
problem is that the meaning of plain meaning is itself not plain.”). Over time, certain 
dictionaries would likely become de facto justified for particular uses on the basis of their 
repeated use in such instances. At present, such repeated use exists, but a justification for doing 
so does not. 
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it seeks to define. Similarly, if the Court selects a particular usage as 
the “correct” one, it should justify why that definition is superior to 
others.165 
E.  Use Multiple Dictionaries 
In accordance with the idea that dictionaries should establish 
only outer boundaries,166 it seems reasonable for the Court to consult 
more than one dictionary. The wide discrepancy in the definitions of 
terms among contemporary, respectable dictionaries is well 
established; for example, the Supreme Court has addressed the 
definition of the word “sacrilege,”167 a word which has a more 
expansive meaning in Webster’s Third than in the American Heritage 
Dictionary.168 Why should the first dictionary taken from the shelf 
control over other equally qualified dictionaries?169 If judges are to be 
truly objective in their quest to determine the ordinary meaning of a 
word, only a scientific approach—a survey of relevant dictionaries—
can bring to light what consensus, if any, exists. To consider only one 
dictionary risks looking out over the proverbial cocktail party and 
selecting a friendly face, as Justice Scalia fears with legislative 
history.170 Using a survey method would instead promote objectivity 
 
 165. See infra Part III.F; see also Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2205 (discussing the problems 
presented by the Court taking the first definition listed in a particular dictionary as the primary 
meaning, given that many dictionaries order definitions historically or provide no method for 
the ordering of definitions). 
 166. See supra Part III.B. 
 167. E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 525–26 (1952). 
 168. Compare WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1996 (1993) 
(defining “sacrilege” as “the crime of stealing, misusing, or desecrating that which is sacred holy, 
or dedicated to sacred uses,” “the unworthy or irreverent use of sacred persons, places, or 
things,” and “the profanation of that which is dedicated to God or to sacred purposes”), with 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 115, at 1530 
(defining “sacrilege” simply as “desecration, profanation, misuse, or theft of something 
sacred”). The American Heritage Dictionary’s definition seems limited to things whereas 
Webster’s Third explicitly includes persons and places, as well as an internal suggestion as to the 
definition of sacred—that it includes things “dedicated to God.” While this distinction might be 
narrow, it could have been relevant to the Court’s consideration of the word in Joseph Burstyn, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), where the court found it impossible to determine the 
meaning of “sacred” in the context of media censorship. Id. at 526. 
 169. This is not to say that all dictionaries are equal. There might be multiple dictionaries, 
however, which meet the criteria discussed in this Part concerning a given use, and judges 
should utilize multiple dictionaries rather than just the first acceptable one they encounter. 
 170. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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and prevent judges from selecting definitions based solely on their 
personal preferences.171 
F.  Acknowledge Contrary Definitions and Dictionaries 
Instead of considering one dictionary authoritative, the proper 
authority for lexicographical meaning should be the lexicon itself, with 
each dictionary providing only a window into the lexicon.172 A 
dictionary is a proxy for demonstrating that the lexicon does (or does 
not) contain a certain meaning. Litigants and judges alike should 
cease the practice of citing to one dictionary alone to make a claim 
about the lexicon when another relevant dictionary supports the 
opposite claim—both definitions should be explicitly acknowledged, 
given that together they make one overall suggestion about the 
lexicon.173 Proper legal arguments should address whether the weight 
of the evidence supports or fails to support a particular reading of the 
lexicon as a whole.174 
In this vein, judges (and even litigants) should acknowledge 
those dictionaries which strike against the meaning presented in a 
brief or opinion. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to cite to 
contrary controlling authority when such authority exists.175 The 
 
 171. Justice Scalia’s criticism of Webster’s Third’s definition of “modify” in MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994), suggests that he, too, should 
support this principle. Id. at 225–27. In proclaiming Webster’s Third’s broader definition of the 
word invalid because it contradicted many other dictionaries, Justice Scalia implicitly acceded to 
the notion that some survey method is necessary—otherwise, the sole dictionary used could 
itself be an outlier. Had Webster’s Third been the only dictionary the Court consulted in MCI, it 
seems likely that the definition Justice Scalia rejected would have been accepted as a possibility. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 136–38. 
 173. One could still attack one of the dictionaries as being inaccurate, poorly made, or 
inapplicable. This argument is quite similar to that of Professor Frederick F. Schauer regarding 
legal arguments in general. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 72 (2009) (“Even more frequently, optional authorities 
are employed in a way that hovers precariously on the edge of genuine authority. Thus, when a 
lawyer in a brief, a judge in an opinion, or a scholar in a law review article makes reference to an 
authority, it is often to provide so-called support for some proposition. . . . But the idea of 
‘support’ here is odd. The authority alleged to provide support is often not one that supports a 
proposition more than another authority negates it. This kind of ‘support’ is a peculiar sense of 
authority, because the balance of all the authorities might not point in one direction or another, 
or might even point against the very proposition allegedly being supported.” (citation omitted)). 
 174. This, in turn, is quite similar to this Note’s earlier argument regarding the survey 
method and the use of multiple dictionaries. See supra Part III.E. 
 175. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known 
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing 
counsel . . . .”). 
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specific requirement specified in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct leaves plenty of room to ignore contrary dictionary 
definitions as noncontrolling without technically violating the rule, 
but honest scholarship requires something more when dictionaries are 
being cited as true authority that a particular word in the lexicon 
means (or doesn’t mean) something.176 There is an almost dishonest 
quality to citing a dictionary as demonstrating a lack of support for a 
particular meaning with the knowledge that other, equally 
appropriate dictionaries or definitions do support that meaning. The 
dissent in a judicial opinion, or an opponent in litigation, can be left 
to account for the discrepancy—but such tactics result in two 
opinions, each holding up different dictionaries177 and claiming a 
monopoly on the “true meaning” of a word when both sides know 
that their chosen dictionary demonstrates no such true meaning. This 
situation is different from that of citing noncontrolling case law. A 
noncontrolling court ruling from another jurisdiction is not cited to 
demonstrate what the law says, but rather what another court said, 
which may or may not be in accordance with the law in the authoring 
court’s jurisdiction. Conversely, both dictionaries cited to support 
opposing propositions invoke the same source of authority: the 
lexicon. 
G.  Account for Weaknesses in Older Dictionaries 
Methods of researching language and creating dictionaries have 
changed over time, generally evolving toward methods that pose 
fewer problems for textualism. First, modern dictionaries are more 
descriptive in nature than their predecessors, making definitions more 
objective and reflective of the plain or ordinary meaning of words.178 
Second, the use of a corpus makes the research materials more 
objective than in the past by relying less on the process of selecting 
specific (and sometimes highly uncommon) usages for inclusion in 
lexicographical research and more on the use of whole sources, such 
as entire newspapers.179 And finally, modern computing technology 
allows those databases to encompass a quantity of material far greater 
 
 176. The purpose of this Note and other similarly focused articles, however, is to undermine 
the idea that any dictionary can be the one true authority on the meaning of a word. 
 177. Sometimes opposing opinions will even cite to different editions of the same dictionary.  
See infra Part IV.B. 
 178. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 179. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
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than the handwritten citation files of the past, making the data a 
better survey of the whole language.180 But if a court is to use a 
contemporaneous dictionary when interpreting an older statute or a 
constitutional provision, it must consider all the weaknesses of the 
methods used in compiling older dictionaries. The Supreme Court, 
for example, frequently cites old dictionaries when considering 
language from the Constitution,181 but the Court seldom justifies why 
the specific dictionaries selected are reliable and whether the 
problems of prescription and completeness have been accounted for 
in the selection. Such justification is most needed with older 
dictionaries, because “modern judge[s] construing an old statute with 
the help of an old dictionary will not have the same intuitive sense of 
the language of the statute and dictionary” as they would with 
modern language.182 In addition, Rickie Sonpal points out the 
additional problems of politics in older dictionaries183 and the inability 
of modern judges to understand “the sexual and moral connotations 
[older] dictionaries attribute to the words.”184 Generally speaking, if 
the language in question “predates Webster’s Second or the first 
edition of the [Oxford English Dictionary], the textualist will need to 
remember that older dictionaries are less broadly based and thus less 
reliable than modern dictionaries.”185 
Overall, older dictionaries present a particular danger in analysis. 
Well-meaning judges can easily attribute inaccurate meanings to 
statutory or constitutional language due to older dictionaries’ political 
nature, tendency to prescribe rather than describe the language, and 
weaker methodology. Furthermore, a modern judge may lack the 
intuitive knowledge about older usage that might have allowed a 
judge more contemporary to the statute to properly understand it.186 
 
 180. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2177–78 (discussing Justice Thomas’s use of 
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773), NATHANIEL 
BAILEY, AN UNIVERSITY ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789), and 
THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796), 
in defining the word “commerce”). 
 182. Id. at 2206. 
 183. See id. at 2212–13 (discussing, for example, the Court’s willingness to rely on Samuel 
Johnson’s dictionary despite clearly demonstrated “linguistic and nationalistic prejudices—
including his scorn for American English and his refusal to record it”). 
 184. Id. at 2214. 
 185. Aprill, supra note 3, at 332. 
 186. To avoid these problems, Sonpal recommends a “usage based” approach, looking to 
contemporary primary sources instead of dictionaries, Sonpal, supra note 122, at 2215–19, 
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H.  Recognize the Limitations 
As this framework shows, the use of dictionaries is complicated 
and their effectiveness in determining the plain meaning of text is 
more limited than many would like to believe. But these limitations 
exist nonetheless. A statute could use a word in an entirely new and 
previously incorrect way—but if, as textualists argue, the text of the 
statute controls, an incorrect or creative use of a word, if supported 
by the context in which it is used, must control above all else. 
Otherwise, the text yields to an external source of interpretation, and 
dictionaries become very much like legislative history indeed.187 
Likewise, the problems associated with older dictionaries may render 
them completely unusable in certain circumstances; in such situations, 
other methods, such as Sonpal’s suggestion of a “usage based” 
approach188 or an appeal to common law or common sense, might be 
more appropriate. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
This Part applies the framework for using dictionaries properly 
in legal reasoning to two Supreme Court cases, testing whether the 
framework proposed in this Note would have assisted the Court in its 
reasoning. 
A.  The Smith Case 
Smith v. United States is perhaps the most frequently discussed 
case concerning the Court and dictionaries, and the case is one of 
Justice Scalia’s favorite examples of flawed acontextual reasoning.189 
Smith involved the application of a statute that increased penalties if, 
“during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime . . . [a person] uses or carries a firearm.”190 The defendant in 
 
though he acknowledges the cost and time issues with such research, noting that truly analyzing 
a word might take the “experienced editors of the Oxford English Dictionary over one month,” 
id. at 2219. This Note argues that a dictionary could still be relevant if used properly, but 
Sonpal’s point stands: old dictionaries can be problematic. 
 187. See supra Part I.C. 
 188. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 189. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 23–24 (describing Smith as an example of strict 
constructionism, “a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into 
disrepute”). 
 190. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Smith v. United States, 508 
U.S. at 227–41 (interpreting § 924(c)(1)). 
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question “used” a MAC-10 machine gun by bartering it for drugs.191 
Arguing before the Court, the defendant-petitioner asserted that the 
statute only applied if the gun were used as a weapon.192 
Explicitly invoking an ordinary meaning analysis,193 Justice 
O’Connor acknowledged that “[l]anguage . . . cannot be interpreted 
apart from context” and that “[t]he meaning of a word that appears 
ambiguous if viewed in isolation may become clear when the word is 
analyzed in light of the terms that surround it.”194 Nonetheless, Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the Court, utilized Webster’s Second to define 
“to use” as “[t]o convert to one’s service” or “to employ” and thus 
found bartering to be within that definition.195 Despite declaring 
context central to the analysis, the Court went on to decide that 
bartering a gun was “using” it within the meaning of the statute on 
the basis of the dictionary’s inclusion of such a definition.196 
Justice Scalia’s dissent—and his subsequent book on 
interpretation—excoriate the majority’s use of the dictionary, stating 
that for a word as “elastic” as “use,” context is particularly 
important.197 As a demonstration of ordinary meaning, Justice Scalia 
asked what someone would imagine using a cane to mean—it would 
not indicate displaying a cane on the wall, but would rather, to an 
ordinary listener, refer to using it to walk. Use of a firearm, he 
argued, is similar: “[T]o speak of ‘using a firearm’ is to speak of using 
it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.”198 The majority’s 
construction of this common word, Justice Scalia wrote, is 
“unquestionably not reasonable and normal.”199 
 
 191. Smith, 508 U.S. at 227–28. 
 192. Id. at 229. 
 193. See id. at 228 (“When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in 
accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”). 
 194. Id. at 229. 
 195. Id. at 228–29 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2806 (2d ed. 
1950)). The Court also utilized Black’s Law Dictionary, which had a similar definition. Id. at 229 
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 196. Id. at 229. 
 197. See id. at 241–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is . . . a fundamental principle of statutory 
construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined 
in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.” (quoting Deal v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993))). 
 198. Id. at 242. 
 199. Id. at 243. 
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Applying his distinction between verification uses and definition 
uses to Smith,200 Professor Hoffman describes the majority’s argument 
as relying on a flawed verification method: 
Although it professes to be interested in the ‘ordinary meaning’ of 
the word that it is defining, the majority ignores the syntactic context 
in which the word appears. . . . ‘The Court does not appear to grasp 
the distinction between how a word can be used and how it 
ordinarily is used.’201 
Such a statement is at the heart of the rule that context should be 
given primacy over single-word definitions; dictionaries should not be 
used to say that a word can mean something that stretches it beyond 
its context. 
In fact, perhaps the real problem with the majority’s approach in 
Smith is the use of a dictionary at all. The statute was relatively 
modern, and everyone on the Court, in the gallery, and in the high 
school down the street knew what “use” can mean—the Court was 
supposed to be determining what it meant within the text of the statute. 
This problematic use of a dictionary highlights two of the rules 
proposed in the framework above: the majority in Smith failed to 
apply the rules of contextuality, and establishing only outer 
boundaries.202 A proper application of the suggested framework would 
have resolved the statutory question in the other direction: bartering 
a gun would not be considered “using” it, and the increased penalties 
would not have attached. 
B.  The Heller Case 
Decided in 2008, District of Columbia v. Heller provides an 
opportunity to apply other parts of the proposed framework to a 
recent and still much-debated constitutional question: does the 
Second Amendment provide an individual right to possess a firearm, 
or a collective right referring only to militias?203 To resolve that 
 
 200. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 201. Hoffman, supra note 21, at 421–22 (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 242). Professor Hoffman 
praises Justice Scalia’s approach in the dissent as proper. See id. at 423 (calling Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning an “admirable attempt to throw off” an out-of-context method of dictionary use). 
 202. See supra Part III.A–B. 
 203. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2008) (noting the 
disagreement between the petitioners and the respondent over whether the amendment relates 
only to militia service or to “an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in 
a militia”). 
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question, the Court analyzed the language of the Second 
Amendment, which reads: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed.”204 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted the uniqueness 
within the Constitution of the first clause of the Second Amendment, 
an explanation of purpose which he termed the “prefatory clause.”205 
Justice Scalia then compared it to the structure of other founding-era 
documents.206 Citing to a later-modified rule from a 1716 English 
case—which held that preambles “could not be used to restrict the 
effect of the words of the purview”—Justice Scalia declared that it is 
settled law in America that a prefatory clause is not controlling when 
the operative clause is clear and unambiguous,207 though a prefatory 
clause could be useful for the sole purpose of “ensur[ing] that our 
reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced 
purpose.”208 
For the purposes of this Note, the most interesting aspect of the 
case is the Court’s construction of the operative clause. Justice Scalia 
broke it into parts—“right of the people”209 and “to keep and bear 
Arms”210—and addressed each separately. Although Justice Scalia 
properly looked to other sources beyond historical dictionaries (such 
as other founding-era documents), the dictionary played a starring 
 
 204. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 205. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789. Scholars have argued that Justice Scalia noted this separation 
simply to reach his desired conclusion and that such a division is not supported by the syntax, 
legislative history, or the historical context of the amendment. See, e.g., William G. Merkel, The 
District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 349, 365 (2009) (noting that dividing the prefatory clause and the operative 
clause was “a crucial step for Justice Scalia as it allow[ed] him to uncouple the right to arms 
from the militia,” even though such an argument is in conflict with the “syntax, the debates in 
the first Congress, and [the] historical context”); see also Brief for Professors of Linguistics and 
English Dennis E. Baron et al. in Support of Petitioners at 5–14, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-
290) (discussing how the structure of the Second Amendment makes the so-called prefatory 
clause an essential component of the meaning of the operative clause). 
 206. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789 (“Although this structure of the Second Amendment is 
unique in our Constitution, other legal documents of the founding era, particularly individual-
rights provisions of state constitutions, commonly included a prefatory statement of purpose.”). 
 207. Id. at 2789 n.3 (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.04 (5th ed. 1992) (citing Copeman v. Gallant, [1716] 24 Eng. 
Rep. 404 (Ch.))). 
 208. Id. at 2790. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 2791. 
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role in defining “keep,” “bear,” and “arms.”211 Justice Scalia cited to a 
number of dictionaries, including Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of 
the English Language (1773), Timothy Cunningham’s A New and 
Complete Law Dictionary (1771), and Webster’s American Dictionary 
of the English Language (1828).212 Applying the framework, a number 
of issues arise. 
1. Use Contextual Analysis Only and Establish Only Outer 
Boundaries.  Perhaps the fundamental problem with Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Heller is that he did exactly what he criticized the majority 
for doing in Smith;213 to borrow Professor Hoffman’s terminology, 
Justice Scalia used a verification argument.214 That is, Justice Scalia 
chose definitions (that “arms” means any kind of weapon, and that 
“keep arms” means to have such weapons) and invoked the 
dictionary to say that those meanings were correct because the 
dictionary contained them.215 But the extent of what a dictionary can 
be used to say about the matter is that the words could have the 
meanings Justice Scalia attributed to them—not that they must have 
those meanings in a given context.216 In his dissent in Smith, Justice 
Scalia noted that “[t]he Court does not appear to grasp the distinction 
between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used.”217 The 
Court, this time represented by Justice Scalia, failed to make that 
distinction in Heller as well.218 
 
 211. See id. (beginning his analysis by looking at the dictionary definitions of “arms”). 
 212. Id. (citing 1 JOHNSON, supra note 181; 1 TIMOTHY CUNNIGHAM, A NEW AND 
COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (London 1771); NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828)).  
 213. See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 23–24 (criticizing the Smith majority’s use of the dictionary 
to define “use” in a manner inconsistent with its plain meaning within the statutory context). 
 214. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text. 
 215. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791–92 (explaining Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the 
amendment’s language). 
 216. And ironically, the strongest piece of contextual evidence is exactly that which Justice 
Scalia quickly dismissed: the prefatory clause. 
 217. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993). Indeed, Justice Stevens’s dissent uses 
this specific quote to criticize Justice Scalia’s acontextual construction of the Second 
Amendment. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2829–30 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 218. The issue in Heller is a bit more complicated than the controversy in Smith, because the 
phrase “keep and bear Arms” is both more complex than a word such as “use,” and because it is 
found in a much older document. And indeed, it may be that Justice Scalia’s interpretation of 
the language is correct—the majority does provide other contextual arguments from the 
founding era. The dictionary, however, simply cannot be used to say that the Second 
Amendment must provide an individual right. All it can be used to show is that it could provide 
such a right, depending on the context. 
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2. Use Contemporaneous Research on Word Meaning.  At first 
glance, the Court seems to have followed this rule, but most of the 
research leading to the creation of the dictionaries cited by the 
majority actually came from the decades before the founding era. For 
example, Justice Scalia cited the 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s 
Dictionary of the English Language and the 1771 edition of Timothy 
Cunningham’s A New and Complete Law Dictionary.219 Considering 
time lag in older dictionaries220 and the tendency of old dictionaries to 
copy even older dictionaries,221 these two works reference the 
language as much as forty years or more before the Second 
Amendment was written.222 However, Justice Scalia also referred to 
Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language,223 
which seems a better fit for this analysis224 and appears to follow the 
concept of citing to multiple dictionaries. 
3. Acknowledge Contrary Definitions and Dictionaries and 
Recognize the Limitations.  Perhaps the most frustrating part about 
both the majority and the dissent in Heller is the failure—on both 
sides—to acknowledge contrary dictionary definitions. For example, 
although Webster’s 1828 dictionary supports the definition of “arms” 
that Justice Scalia selected,225 defining “arms” as “[w]eapons of 
offense, or armor for defense and protection of the body,” the same 
dictionary also provides a second definition: “[w]ar; hostility.”226 The 
 
 219. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791; see also supra note 212. 
 220. See supra Part II.C.4. 
 221. See supra note 122. 
 222. And this gap in time can matter. For a discussion of the changes in the English 
language around the founding era, see supra note 156. Justice Scalia himself has, in the past, 
been sensitive to time gaps of this size. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 
228 (1994) (noting that when the Communications Act became law in 1934, Webster’s Third 
“was not yet even contemplated,” even though Webster’s Third was published in 1976 and thus 
probably contains research from the decades before that time). 
 223. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791; see also supra note 212. 
 224. In his dissent, Justice Stevens cites THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 634 (2d ed. 
1989) to provide a definition for “bear arms,” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 
which was created at a time far later than the relevant period. 
 225. WEBSTER, supra note 212; see also Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791 (citing WEBSTER, supra 
note 212, and likening this dictionary’s definition to the definitions provided by other 
dictionaries, which say that “arms” are weapons of offense or armor of defense). 
 226. WEBSTER, supra note 212. 
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entry then gives a number of examples of arms, several of which 
involve war or soldiers.227 
In the dissent, Justice Stevens cited another edition of one of the 
same dictionaries cited by the majority to reach the opposite 
conclusion. Justice Stevens referenced the 1755 edition of Samuel 
Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language to assert that “arms” 
refers to “[w]eapons of offence, or armour of defence.”228 Justice 
Stevens also referred to “literally dozens of contemporary texts” to 
say that “bear arms” “refers most naturally to a military 
purpose,”229—just as Justice Scalia did to make the opposite 
argument.230 Neither side seemed willing to acknowledge the other 
side’s evidence—including the warring dictionary definitions. 
The dispute in Heller typifies the problem that this Note 
addresses. The dictionary was used by both sides in the same way that 
Justice Scalia argues that legislative history can be incorrectly used in 
judicial interpretation: as an external, nonauthoritative source used to 
pick out a supporting argument while ignoring any contradictory 
information in that same source. A dictionary simply cannot be used 
to say that a word like “bear” or “arms” must have meant a particular 
thing—in fact, the very dictionaries used by the Justices show that 
those words could have meant several different things. But such 
acknowledgements are absent from the opinions. Instead, both sides 
in Heller use dictionaries to prop up conflicting evidence as decisive.231 
 
 227. See id. (providing, for example, that “[t]o arms” denotes “taking arms for war or 
hostility; particularly a summoning to war”). Interestingly, Webster also provides another 
definition of “arms,” stating that, “[i]n law, arms are any thing which a man takes in his hand in 
anger, to strike or assault another.” Id. 
 228. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 JOHNSON, supra note 181 
(London, 1st ed. 1755)). Justice Stevens also quoted from a dictionary-like reference guide from 
1794 to say that “[b]y arms, we understand those instruments of offence generally made use of 
in war.” Id. (quoting JOHN TRUSLER, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS ESTEEMED 
SYNONYMOUS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 37 (London, 3d ed. 1794)). 
 229. Id. 
 230. E.g., id. at 2792 n.7 (majority opinion). That said, considerable evidence suggests that 
the general use of “bear arms” contemporary to the Second Amendment was overwhelmingly 
related to military service. See Merkel, supra note 205, at 353 (discussing findings from over 120 
American newspapers contemporary to the Second Amendment suggesting that roughly 98 
percent of the uses of the phrase were related to military or militia service). 
 231. It is not correct that the responsibility for making counterarguments lies with the other 
side. A strong supporting argument in favor of contradictory evidence is not necessary, but the 
simple acknowledgment that such evidence exists is. It is inaccurate to say that the evidence 
clearly supports one meaning while evidence exists suggesting otherwise. See supra Part III.F. 
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Neither side recognizes the limitations inherent in citation to 
dictionaries. 
4. Demonstrating a Potential Bias.  As discussed in Part III, a 
dictionary is essentially used as a proxy for the meaning of a word 
within the language as a whole—much as a survey might be used as a 
proxy for the opinions of the population as a whole.232 The use of 
dictionaries as proxies is, perhaps, necessary in textualist 
interpretation because conducting a true linguistic analysis is far too 
burdensome for a court to do on its own. Recognizing the rationale 
behind the use of dictionaries, it is interesting that the Heller majority 
did not more directly engage with a truer proxy for word meaning: 
the considered research and findings of linguistics professors on this 
specific subject.233 Rarely are such findings available for the Court to 
use. In Heller, however, professors of linguistics and English filed an 
amicus brief discussing in great detail the linguistic construction of the 
Second Amendment with an eye toward how it would have been 
perceived at the time of its creation.234 
The professors’ brief accounts for all of the considerations that 
the blind use of dictionaries fails to: it considers the context of the 
words,235 it focuses on contemporary writings in making its structural 
comparisons, and it uses multiple lexicographic sources for reaching 
its conclusions.236 Justice Scalia, however, preferred a dictionary 
approach to that of the linguistics experts.237 According to the amicus 
brief, a broader survey of dictionaries and contemporary writings 
reveals that “[i]n each instance where ‘bear arms’ . . . is used without 
additional language modifying the phrase, it is unquestionably used in 
its ordinary idiomatic sense,” which is service as a soldier in the 
 
 232. See supra Part III.F. 
 233. For a discussion of the true goal of using a dictionary as a window into the lexicon, see 
supra Part III. 
 234. Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron et al. in Support of 
Petitioners, supra note 205. 
 235. In fact, the brief’s entire first argument focuses on how the structure of the Second 
Amendment affects the meaning of the words within it. See id. at 5–14 (arguing that the 
“absolute construction” of the prefatory clause causes it to function as a sentence modifier). 
 236. See id. (utilizing structural comparison and multiple sources of meaning to assess the 
plain meaning of the Second Amendment). 
 237. See id. at 23–24 (examining usage in “books, pamphlets, broadsides, and newspapers 
from the period between the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Second 
Amendment”). 
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military.238 In fact, historian Saul Cornell compiled 115 texts 
containing the phrase “bear arms,” finding that 110 used it in a 
military context and that four of the remaining five added additional 
words to the phrase to give it a nonmilitary context.239 Justice Scalia’s 
preference for the dictionary (and his own linguistic intuition) over 
the scientific method used by the linguistics professors is troubling 
because it places more importance on a judge’s personal perspective 
on the language than on objective research.240 
CONCLUSION 
Textualism demands adherence to an objective, original meaning 
of the text. Thus, it is no surprise that dictionaries are so appealing to 
textualists: dictionaries present an aura of objective authority, and 
there are dictionaries from any time period relevant for legal analysis. 
But fidelity to textualist principles requires a disciplined approach to 
using dictionaries because they are neither as objective nor as 
authoritative as they seem. And their misuse can lead to exactly what 
textualists often bemoan: the personal preferences of judges creeping 
into their interpretations of statutes or the Constitution. 
Although some writers have concluded that the inner workings 
and flaws of dictionaries make them completely unsuitable for use by 
judges and litigants, this Note has sought to provide a different 
approach, identifying the complications provided by dictionaries—
some mentioned in previous articles, some new—and creating a broad 
framework centered upon avoiding those pitfalls. If textualists, and 
indeed all judges, can account for the dangers inherent in the use of 
dictionaries in legal interpretation, perhaps they can still use 
dictionaries to provide valuable insight without undermining the 
objective rationality that is central to legal discourse. 
 
 238. Id. at 20–21. 
 239. Id. at 24. 
 240. One could attack the linguistics professors, whose brief supported the petitioners, for 
their own biases. But a proper argument would instead be directed to the validity of their 
findings. Further, this Section does not intend to imply that scientific linguistic analysis should 
automatically merit total deference. The point is that the Court had the benefit of this 
information, which is conceptually truer to textualist aims than dictionaries can hope to be, and 
engaged with it only minimally. 
